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1Always Read the Label:
The Identity and Strategy of Britain’s ‘Christian Right’
Introduction
Religious extremism is one of the leitmotifs of our time. Issues of fundamentalism,
religiously inspired violence, radicalisation and reactionary theology shape political events
and create prominent media headlines in all parts of the world. In Britain, the debate around
religious extremism has centred overwhelmingly on issues relating to Islam, with concerns
about other faiths having been relegated to the margins. In particular, the subject of
extremism within Britain’s single largest faith – Christianity – has been notably under-
explored. On the face of it this lack of attention might seem to be well deserved.
Conservative Christian (often defined as ‘fundamentalist’) cause groups are relatively few in
number and are typically considered to exert little practical influence, both in a cultural as
well as a political sense. Yet further exploration of this topic is not entirely without merit.
Indeed, in recent years conservative Christian groups have been involved in a variety of
controversial issues and public policy debates, including high profile disputes around free
speech, abortion, assisted dying, same-sex marriage, the regulation of medical technologies,
religious freedom and equalities legislation, that make studying their political activities a
meaningful and worthwhile endeavour.
An interesting question in this respect concerns the existence of a British ‘Christian Right’
comparable to the social movement that rose to prominence in the United States during the
late 1970s. Commentators who assert the reality of such a grouping point to the political
activism of conservative Christian groups as evidence of a mobilised fundamentalist force.
Conversely, those critical of such claims point to a lack of actual political influence and
2highlight the marked differences between the British and U.S. contexts in order to argue that
a British ‘Christian Right’ does not exist.
What is absent from these debates, however, is an awareness of how labels such as ‘Christian
Right’ or ‘fundamentalist’ are shaped by the underlying political dynamics of group
mobilisation. Identity markers are an essential part of collective political action and play a
key role in maintaining group solidarity and cohesion, as well as framing a group
strategically for the pursuit of wider political aims. This paper explores these issues by
utilising insights from Social Identity Theory and by drawing on elite-level interviews with
representatives of the main conservative Christian groups that are linked to the idea of a
British ‘Christian Right’. It shows that these actors reject the ‘Christian Right’ and
‘fundamentalist’ labels, but that this rejection is embedded within a broader public narrative
that has been constructed as a strategic response to challenges posed by the process of
secularisation.
Faith at the margins
Academic studies into the notion of a British ‘Christian Right’ have, to date, been relatively
few in number. Research into the historical, sociological and anthropological qualities of
conservative Christian groups and viewpoints has tended to eschew such terminology,1 and,
as the Christian think-tank, Theos, notes: ‘There has been surprisingly little hard research into
the alleged size, influence and strategy of a purported Religious Right in the UK’.2 Most of
the arguments and debates on this topic have subsequently taken place outside the walls of
the Academy, principally involving members of the media, political activists and online
commentators.
In both academic and non-academic spheres, however, opinion on the existence of a British
Christian Right varies. Stephen Hunt, for instance, contends that while a Christian Right
3exists, it is ‘in few ways comparable’ to its U.S counterpart (despite sharing ‘largely the
same’ issues of concern),3 while Cynthia Burack and Angelia Wilson highlight a shared
emphasis on themes of homosexuality, noting that: ‘Since the 1970s, in both the US and the
UK, the Conservative Christian Right has developed and operationalised its antigay ideology
in order to perpetuate or challenge relations and institutions of power’.4 By the same token,
Jamie Doward and Gaby Hinsliff, writing in the Guardian, claimed that the case of the
musical, Jerry Springer the Opera, in which the play was besieged by protests (leading to its
eventual closure) orchestrated by conservative Christian groups, ‘raised fears that the spectre
of Christian fundamentalism was stalking the land’,5 and in 2008 a high-profile Dispatches
documentary for Channel 4, entitled ‘In God’s Name’, warned that fundamentalist Christians
inspired by the U.S Religious Right were ‘growing in number and influence’ and were
‘determined to impose their beliefs on the rest of society’.6 Two years hence, Sunny Hundal,
writing in the New Statesman, claimed that the influence of Christian fundamentalists (said to
‘form a noisy wing of the Conservative Party’) was ‘growing fast’,7 and in 2013 Nelson
Jones highlighted ‘a strong historic link between religious and moral conservatism and
Conservative politics’, adding that ‘the conservative Christian lobby has powerful friends in
government’.8 Making a similar point, Ben Quinn warned of ‘a British-style religious right’,
claiming that ‘the presence and influence of a socially conservative bloc is very real’.9
Others, however, have taken a rather different view. According to Terry Sanderson, the
President of the National Secular Society, there is ‘no Religious Right in Britain’ and ‘those
who aspire to create one have, so far, failed completely to make much progress’.10 This is a
view shared by Martyn Eden, the political editor for Premier Christian Radio, who notes that
conservative Christian groups ‘are not yet a significant influence in British politics worthy of
the religious right label’.11 Scholarly rebuttals, notably from Steve Bruce, Martin Durham,
and (to a lesser extent) Theos, have raised a number of pointed objections based on a direct
4comparison to the core features of the U.S Christian Right. One issue here is the absence of a
block conservative Christian vote linked to a single political party. While the U.S Christian
Right has strong links to the Republicans, Christian voting and affiliation in Britain (even for
its more conservative forms) is very much a divided, cross-party affair.12 A second issue
concerns the limited social and political influence of conservative Christians in Britain. Being
numerically smaller and financially weaker than their U.S counterparts, conservative
Christians have thus far struggled to make any obvious headway in key political areas. In
recent years a series of high-profile campaigns involving opposition to abortion, scientific
research using human embryonic stem cells and the legalisation of same-sex marriage, have
been lost. Differences in political complexion are important here as well. Conservative
Christians in Britain tend to engage with a different set of issues, and (for the most part) have
more left-of-centre economic views than their counterparts in the U.S Christian Right.
Besides a number of overlapping themes (centring, most notably, on issues such as the ethics
of sexual reproduction and religious freedom), the concerns of the U.S. movement, with its
support for military interventions, strong pro-Israel stance, its advocacy of creationism and its
dislike of Big Government, are said to diverge substantially from those of conservative
Christian groups in Britain.13 Further differences are highlighted in the respective opportunity
structures available to British and U.S. Christian groups. While the federal and de-centred
structures of the U.S. political system provide numerous points of access for Christian groups
seeking to shape and influence political life, the unitary, centralised and tightly controlled
political system in Britain is said to provide far fewer opportunities for groups seeking to
advance a political agenda.14 Given these differences, the general view here, as Paul Bickley
puts it, is that:
5the oft-repeated claim that there is a coherent and organised network driven by a
growing conservative religious base, machinating behind the scenes, waiting to lay hold
of the levers of power in a way that is corrosive of public debate or the broader political
culture, is either fearful misunderstanding, a deliberate misrepresentation or a mix of
the two.15
The crux of this debate, and hence the question of whether or not a British ‘Christian Right’
can be said to exist, however, is to a large extent a definitional one. Those rejecting the idea
(and, by extension, the existence of a politically influential conservative Christian movement)
typically do so by highlighting the lack of practical political impact exerted by conservative
Christian groups, and by comparing them directly to the characteristics and features of the
U.S movement, against which they are duly said to fall short. Those arguing that a British
Christian Right does exist, on the other hand, claim that rejecting its existence purely on the
basis of a U.S comparison is a tautological form of reasoning that obscures the fact that
politically influential (at least potentially) conservative Christian groups are a reality.
The issue is compounded by the fact that there is no consensus over what a British Christian
Right might actually look like in terms of its key characteristics and features, nor over which
groups may or may not belong to it. Statistics on the extent and nature of Christian
fundamentalism in Britain, and hence details about the broader social constituency to which a
Christian Right might appeal, are also lacking. This poses an intractable methodological
dilemma for assessing whether, and to what extent, a ‘Christian Right’ in Britain exists, but at
stake are more than issues of typology or academic boundary marking. Arguments about the
use of descriptors such as ‘Christian Right’ or ‘fundamentalism’ reflect, and are enmeshed
with, an array of wider factors around the political dynamics of group mobilisation. These
themes are usefully highlighted with the conceptual framework of Social Identity Theory.
6Deriving from the disciplines of psychology and sociology, this attempts to provide a holistic
account of cognitive and social processes, centring on the key role that identity issues play in
group cohesion and collective political action.16 While identity is considered to be an
essential component of an individual’s conception of self, it is also intricately embedded
within a broader web of social and cultural relations. The particular components of an
identity are also far from being static and fixed, but involve on-going and open-ended
processes of reaffirmation and reconstruction. In this, the role of groups is thought to be
particularly important. Although the precise motivations behind group membership vary,17
groups provide key sites for the development and maintenance of identities; facilitating a
sense of belonging and meaning as well as establishing norms for appropriate beliefs and
behaviours. In this way, a collective basis for identity provides a focal point around which
individual agents can coalesce, and can form a motivating factor for the promotion of shared
interests based around common themes, issues and concerns.18
A key feature of collective identity is a corporate desire on the part of groups to maintain a
sense of internal cohesion and intergroup differentiation. This requires constant efforts to
police for internal deviance that might threaten the solidarity and interests of the group, as
well as to monitor the boundary between the group and the rest of society in order to ensure
that a sense of distinctiveness is sustained.19 Notions of collective identity also serve broader
political objectives. The way in which the values, needs and interests of a group are framed
plays a crucial role in helping to position the group in respect of wider society and in
legitimising its activities, viewpoints and claims (while simultaneously trying to delegitimise
and negate those of its opponents).20 These dynamics of group mobilisation are typically
sharpened in situations involving uncertainty and/or where a threat to the group and its
interests is thought to exist.21
7In this context the value of Social Identity Theory is that it highlights two salient points. The
first of these is that the use of identity markers is an essential part of collective action
framing: being necessary to energise and unify the membership of a group, but also forming a
means of strategically positioning it in order to help facilitate the achievement of wider
political ambitions. The second point is that these considerations mean that the adoption or
rejection of an identity marker (such as ‘Christian Right’) will be shaped by a number of
factors, including the main social, political and cultural issues that are thought to be affecting
the group, the character of the relationships that exist within the group as well as between the
group and wider society, and the specific nature and composition of the group itself,
including its primary goals and objectives.
The composition of the ‘Christian Right’
This paper explores these issues by examining the collective action frames deployed by the
main groups that are typically said to belong to a British ‘Christian Right’. Although there is
no consensus on which groups might be involved in such a bloc, a number of core
organisations attract consistent and repeated attention within the literature and commentary
on the topic. These groups, primarily, include: the Christian Institute, the Evangelical
Alliance, Anglican Mainstream, Christian Concern, Christian Voice, Christian Action
Research and Education (CARE), the Conservative Christian Fellowship, the Christian
Medical Fellowship, Core Issues Trust and the Christian Legal Centre.22
The bulk of the empirical research for this study was based on a series of eight semi-
structured interviews with elite-level representatives drawn from these organisations.
Requests for an interview were directed either to the head of the organisation itself or, where
this was not appropriate (for instance, where such a position was unclear or did not exist) to
the organisation’s preferred contact point. All but two of the organisations (CARE and the
8Christian Institute) agreed to take part in the project. Five of the interviewees were directly
responsible for leading their organisation, and all participants were involved at a senior
operational and decision-making (e.g. managerial or directorial) level. The interviews, which
were conducted during the spring of 2013, typically lasted for one hour and followed a
standard pattern of questioning. This core research was supplemented by a further series of
interviews (conducted between spring 2013 and spring 2015) with elite representatives from a
number of more mainstream religious and non-religious organisations. Amongst these
included bishops from the Church of England, Christian think-tanks and the British Humanist
Association.
The relatively small number of interviewees involved in the core study means that care needs
to be taken when generalising from its findings. The composition of the main sample was
also predominantly male and white, and was largely (but not exclusively) London-centric.
This may also limit the wider applicability of the views and opinions expressed.
Nevertheless, these limitations are not unduly prohibitive. The primary interview sample
included representatives from most of the main ‘Christian Right’ organisations in Britain and,
as such, provides a valuable insight into critical aspects of their worldview.
One key feature of these groups is that they are overwhelmingly evangelical in their
orientation. While evangelicalism comes in a variety of forms and has no centralised,
doctrinal authority, its principal features (following Bebbington’s famous ‘quadrilateral’) are
often said to rest on four central pillars: conversionism (the view that lives need to be
changed through discipleship), Biblicism (regarding the Bible as the word of God), activism
(promoting the word of God through evangelistic methods) and cruciocentrism (referring to
the centrality of Christ’s sacrifice on the cross).23
Firm data on the exact numbers of people that are likely to be members or supporters of
‘Christian Right’ organisations, though, remains elusive. Some groups (such as Christian
9Concern and Anglican Mainstream) do not have formal membership structures, and others
(such as Christian Voice) do not make details of their membership publicly known. The
variable quality of the available information also makes direct comparisons between groups
difficult. The Christian Medical Fellowship, for example, counts over 4,000 doctors and 800
medical students among its membership; the Evangelical Alliance (Britain’s largest umbrella
organisation for evangelical Christians) purports to represent evangelicals from no fewer than
seventy-nine denominations (with more than 23,000 members); while Christian Concern
points to a mailing list of over 43,000 individuals and churches.24
In financial terms these organisations are relatively small. According to the latest annual
accounts submitted to the Charity Commission, the Christian Institute had a yearly income of
£2.6 million for the year ending December 2014, the Evangelical Alliance had £2.3 million
(up to March 2015), CARE had an income of just under £2 million (March 2015), and the
Christian Medical Fellowship had an income stream of £1.3 million (December 2014).
Virtually all these earnings came from voluntary donations. These figures, however, pale in
comparison to the larger charities (both religious and non-religious) in Britain. The National
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, for example, has an annual income in
excess of £134 million, while the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds has a comparable
income of £132 million. The largest (overtly) religious charity, Christian Aid, had an income
of £100 million, followed by the Elim Foursquare Gospel Alliance, with £68 million, and
Tearfund, with £62 million.25
Measuring the wider social support for these organisations is also problematic. One issue
here concerns the inadequacies of existing survey data. The 2011 census question on religious
identification in England and Wales, for instance, simply allowed Christian respondents to
categorise themselves in general terms, as: ‘Christian (including Church of England,
Catholic, Protestant and all other Christian denominations)’.26 More specific statistics, from
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the 2005 English Church census, showed that two-fifths of regular churchgoers in England
attended evangelical churches, equating to a (not insignificant) figure of 1.26 million
people.27 The largest survey of evangelical opinion in Britain (conducted by the Evangelical
Alliance and involving a poll of over 15,000 self-identifying evangelicals) found strong
support for conservative views (with almost two-fifths of respondents professing a belief in
hell and around a fifth maintaining that Christianity and evolution were incompatible),28 but
the proportion of evangelicals likely to sympathise with the political activities of a Christian
Right remains unknown. Research also shows that while most fundamentalists tend to be
evangelicals, the opposite relationship is not true,29 and the negative connotations associated
with the term ‘fundamentalist’ (along with the fact that survey respondents are unlikely to
self identify themselves in this way) makes gaining more detailed information a highly
difficult task.30
Aims, activities and challenges
Conservative groups linked to a ‘Christian Right’ have a number of similar aims. Within the
general remit of promoting a greater role for Christianity in British public life, common
campaigns in recent years have included: attempts to lower the legal time limit for abortions
(an amendment to the 2008 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill sought to lower this
from 24 to 20 weeks), opposition to developments in medical technologies (notably research
using human embryonic stem cells), opposition to the legalisation of same-sex marriage
(which became law in 2013 despite the most coordinated and concerted campaign effort
involving conservative Christian groups seen in recent years) and opposition to the
legalisation of assisted suicide (the most recent attempt to liberalise the law in this regard was
defeated in 2015). Anti-drug, anti-pornography and anti-gambling campaigns, as well as on-
going efforts to defend and promote religious freedom, are popular causes too.
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Beyond this, conservative Christian organisations also engage in a variety of group-specific
activities. The Christian Medical Fellowship was established in 1948 to help and support
Christians in the medical profession. Christian Action Research and Education was set up in
1971 as the direct successor to the Festival of Light (a 1970s movement which emerged in
response to concerns about the permissive society), and the Christian Institute began in the
late 1980s (being formally established in 1991) as a reaction to concerns about ‘the moral
direction of the nation’.31 More recently, Anglican Mainstream (established in 2005) and
Core Issues Trust (in 2007) emerged in response to changing social views and issues around
sexuality. Christian Concern was formed in 2008 to act as a sister organisation to the
Christian Legal Centre, which was established to defend and support the legal rights of
Christians the previous year.
Following the tenets of Social Identity Theory, the activities of conservative Christian
organisations are primarily directed towards two separate kinds of audiences: internal and
external. The former of these (what might be termed ‘inward-facing’) activities, are tailored
towards members of the group or like-minded constituencies, and are designed to address
issues and concerns that are particular to the group itself or to its own sectional area of
expertise (such as providing legal support or advice). In this respect, a key role of
conservative Christian groups is to help reinforce a sense of identity and belonging.
According to one interviewee, for instance, a central goal of their organisation is to show
‘ordinary Christian people’ that someone is out there making their case, and to reassure them
that they are not ‘swivel-eyed loons’.32 Another notes that the direction of their organisation
is ‘not so much campaigns, it’s more drawing things to people’s attention’, and that its efforts
are ‘not so much aimed at the general public, but just to raise up a standard so that people
who are listening who agree with me say “oh yeah, hang on a minute, somebody there’s
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saying what I believe”’. The general aim is ‘to provide a testimony … a little flag that people
can rally around’.33
Running parallel to this, the external (or ‘outward-facing’) activities of conservative Christian
groups are aimed principally at shaping opinions at the level of British society and culture
with a view to promoting a greater role for Christianity and influencing public policy issues.
These goals are clearly expressed in the public mission statements of conservative Christian
groups themselves. The declared aim of Christian Concern, for example, is ‘to work to infuse
a biblical worldview into every aspect of society ... to be a strong Christian voice in the
public sphere’, and to ‘change public opinion on issues of key importance and affect policy at
the highest levels’. In like fashion, the aim of the Christian Institute is ‘the furtherance and
promotion of the Christian religion in the United Kingdom’, with the overall objective being
for the British state ‘to adopt Christian values and to implement godly laws’.34
Interviewees maintain that these objectives do not reflect a desire to impose religious values
on the rest of society, but are simply about ensuring equal participation in British public life.
As one respondent puts it, politics is ‘a dirty old business but it’s an important business, it’s
about running the country, why wouldn’t you want men and women of faith and values being
involved in it to bring their principles and their integrity, their faith and so on, into that
square?’35 Another explains that the general aim is not ‘to create some kind of theocracy that
overrules the rights and views of people who differ fundamentally from ourselves’, but
simply to find a way ‘that allows society to enable different points of view to function’.36
Likewise, another representative maintains that a key ambition is to see a society ‘in which
the central position of the church in the country is still maintained, and there’s a recognition
and understanding that Biblical principles, the outworking of individuals and the church’s
position on Christian faith is recognised as being one for the public good’.37
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The public policy activities of conservative Christian groups are promoted through a wide
variety of methods. These include the production of briefing papers, journals, newsletters and
books, providing web-based resources and social media engagement, involvement in public
talks, debates and media interviews, as well as lobbying activities such as meetings with MPs
and related parties for campaign and informational purposes. The ability of such groups to
access the structures of power, however, are variable. One of the more politically engaged
organisations, CARE, supplements its lobbying activities by directly supplying interns to
MPs as a way of gaining a foothold inside the political system. This scheme is described by a
former member of CARE with close links to the programme as having been designed to:
train-up Christian leaders who were politically savvy, knew what was what, understood
the political process … and would therefore influence public life in their own right
when they were established in their political public life career … It was the goal of the
programme to have political influence when these interns became MPs.38
Most organisations, however, lack such a direct channel of access and seek to effect change
by other means. One interviewee, for example, notes that evangelical Christians in Britain are
‘a small minority’ (being variously described as ‘a sub-culture’ and ‘aliens in exile’), and are
‘trying to influence the direction society takes by ensuring or doing what we can in a
democratic society with what limited power we have’. A central aim in this is to shape what
are described as the ‘Mountains of Culture’ (including Parliament, the Courts, universities,
the Church and the media), ‘and part of that is … trying to get laws which embody Judeo-
Christian values on the statute books, trying to get Christian values shaping public life’.39
Supporting this wide-ranging approach, another representative declares that ‘all facets of the
public sphere, law, politics, media, even the academies’ are central to their mission, because
14
‘in terms of influence in the public sphere … they’re intertwined’.40 Another maintains that
the core goals of their organisation are based around ‘influencing the social, cultural and
spiritual discourse in a number of ways … so it’s a bit of lobbying, it’s a bit of advocacy, it’s
a bit of representation’.41
Despite this organisational diversity, Christian Right groups face a number of common
challenges that are linked to the growing pressures of secularisation and the long-term decline
of religion in Britain. According to official figures from the Office for National Statistics, the
proportion of the adult population in England and Wales describing themselves as ‘Christian’
declined from 71.7% in 2001 to 59.3% in 2011,42 while figures from British Social Attitudes
in 2013 found that a straight majority of people (50.4%) now described themselves as
belonging to ‘no religion’ for the first time.43 A raft of other surveys suggesting that
secularising trends continue to run through every indicator of religiosity – including beliefs,
attendance and membership – further underpin these findings.44
A meta-analysis of opinion poll data (drawn from 123 national and 35 local surveys) reveals
a similar picture of decline in the status of the Bible, suggesting a growing disjuncture
between one of the central pillars of the evangelical worldview and mainstream British
society. While 82% of evangelical churchgoers professed to read or listen to the Bible at least
once a week in 2010, the overall proportion of British adults doing so at least once a month
fell from 24% in 1973 to just 8% in 2013. Literal interpretations of the Bible are also in
decline. In 1973 56% of the British public proclaimed a belief in ‘Bible truth’, but in 2008
just 26% agreed that the Bible represented the divinely inspired word of God. Evangelical
opinion, on the other hand, was far stronger. In 2010 almost three quarters (72%) of
evangelical churchgoers claimed that the Bible was without error. In 2011 83% of
evangelicals claimed that the Bible was the supreme authority guiding their beliefs, opinions
and behaviours.45
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These dynamics present a twin dilemma for conservative Christian groups: imposing strategic
pressures to position themselves within what is now an increasingly secularised environment,
but to do so in a way that maintains a sense of internal cohesion and unity amongst group
members. Here, the main response in terms of collective action framing has been the
construction of a narrative built upon two primary assertions. The first is that secularisation
poses a serious threat to the social and moral probity of the nation. The second is that it
represents a danger to religious rights and freedoms.46
A key theme here is that the decline of Christianity has led to a loss of social cohesion, the
rise of a crude individualist, consumerist culture and a sense of moral relativism, all of which
are considered to be at the root of many of Britain’s social problems. Common assertions in
this respect include the claim that ‘there’s no longer a consensus about what’s right and
wrong’, and that ‘we’re in a post-Christian multi-faith relativistic society where each person
decides their own view’;47 that ‘the whole system is breaking down, at every level’, with the
1960s/70s being a pivotal turning point in the emergence of ‘this diversity stuff and being
politically correct’;48 and that many of Britain’s problems are attributable to the fact that
‘[w]e don’t love Jesus enough … We don’t believe in a God that will judge, and in heaven
and hell’.49 In the same way, another respondent maintains that Britain’s social malaise is
directly linked to the loss of Biblical principles. As they put it: ‘This is what happens when a
society does not follow something straightforward like the 10 commandments, but says “no
no no, we’re free to do what we want”’.50
The second prominent claim in respect of secularisation is that Christianity in Britain is
becoming increasingly marginalised at the hands of vocal minority groups, most notably
homosexual, Islamic and secularist campaigners keen to drive religion from the public
square. A central feature of this claim is the notion that there now exists a competing
hierarchy of rights in Britain, and that the rights of Christians have become subordinate to
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those of other social groups. Legal provisions on human rights (such as the European
Convention on Human Rights and the 1998 Human Rights Act) alongside legislative
measures designed to promote greater equality and fairness (such as the 2004 Civil
Partnership Act, the 2007 and 2010 Equality Acts as well as, more recently, the legalisation
of same-sex marriage) have been instrumental in the adoption of this approach too.51 Claims
that measures such as these pose a direct threat to religious freedom have been accompanied
by a series of high-profile legal challenges, most of which have centred on issues of alleged
employment discrimination on religious grounds. Four of these cases were heard, and three of
them rejected, by the European Court of Human Rights in 2013.
Perceptions of marginalisation are highly prevalent among representatives of conservative
Christian groups. Describing a situation of ‘residual, secular antipathy towards all religion
generally, but Christianity specifically’, one interviewee describes the situation in Britain as
one in which:
Christians are discriminated against in the public square … We are being marginalised,
there’s no doubt about that … you’ve got a hundred years of a secular experiment that’s
gone all wobbly all over the place and people see religion as a threat to their power, to
their influence and their world view.52
Another representative, making the same point, claims that: ‘secularists want to drive religion
out of the public sphere, to leave the field clear for them’, and are ‘creating a spiritual
vacuum … that Islam is waiting to fill’.53 From a similar vantage point is the argument that
the marginalisation of Christians has been driven by ‘an aggressive secularism that claims to
be value neutral’ but in reality represents ‘an attempt to rid Western civilisation of Judeo-
Christian values … it’s reminiscent, really, of the Soviet state, and it’s a complete denial of
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an individual or groups’ right to be able to express themselves freely’.54 Another asserts,
equally vigorously, that ‘the whole equalities agenda’ is ‘predicated upon a very liberal
view’, and has led directly to ‘oppression and censorship’ to the extent that anyone
disagreeing is ‘cut out of the public space’. Thus: ‘if your equality and diversity policies
mean that, let’s say, homosexual rights trump the Christian’s rights, then … politically you
have no rights because the political ideology does not recognise your right to manifest your
faith in the public sphere’.55
Interestingly, alongside the actions of militant minority groups, ‘Christian Right’
organisations also put much of the blame for the marginalisation of religion on the actions of
government and the churches themselves. Alongside the extensions to human rights and
equalities legislation introduced by New Labour during the first decade of the twenty-first
century is a pervasive sense of disappointment and anger with the actions of the
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government. Key complaints here have centred on
the legalisation of same-sex marriage and on the government’s treatment of religious groups,
especially in terms of the greater role for faith-based organisations that was pledged for the
Big Society agenda, but which was never fully delivered. Typical opinions here include the
claim that the various restrictions that have been imposed on charities in the delivery of the
Big Society, especially in respect of equality and diversity measures, mean that ‘the ability
for the church to serve is then strangled’;56 that the government were ‘quite religiously
illiterate in different ways, and even hostile’ towards religion;57 and that ‘the problem is what
the government has wanted is the benefit that the Christian organisations bring in particular –
which is loads of good social work on the ground – but you try and put Jesus in or prayer in,
the thing that actually changes lives’, and the real attitude was ‘don’t give out the bibles,
don’t talk about Jesus’.58 One interviewee puts the point more forcefully still, claiming that
the legalisation of same-sex marriage was ‘completely bonkers … even demonic’,59 and
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another accuses the government of having ‘abused religious people’. As they complain, the
government’s approach is ‘an attempt to, on the one hand, say that religions are important,
and on the other hand to completely emasculate them in terms of any effectiveness in
society’.60
The role of the church in the marginalisation of religion, on the other hand, is said to reside in
its own wilful, decades long abandonment of the public square. One representative claims
that their organisation ‘would not need to exist if the church of England had spoken with a
clear voice’, and laments that many of the problems associated with secularisation have
emerged as a result of ‘the church failing to take her place, others vying loud in the public
space’.61 Supporting this view, another respondent notes that ‘a number of other
organisations’ have been ‘very active and very strong when it comes to lobbying … there is a
tide that’s turning, and unless the church stands up and speaks, we won’t be entitled to hold
that position in the public sphere’.62 Highlighting the lack of engagement from Christians
themselves, one interviewee expresses a desire to see ‘Christ’s church militant here on earth’
and for Christians to become more politically organised, ‘getting out on to the streets and
being active in the public sphere, getting elected, all these sorts of things’.63
Labels and framing
A key and related feature of this narrative is a wholesale rejection of the idea that a ‘Christian
Right’ exists in Britain. Two key themes are particularly apposite here. One is the notion that
efforts to create such a movement would be doomed to fail given Britain’s social and political
situation. As an example of this point, one interviewee claims that: ‘I don’t think there’s any
purchase for a heavy-handed Christian right over here at all’, and notes that while there are
‘some of the old-fashioned UKIP-y type people who might want to buy into that … I just
don’t see the need for it or desire for it’.64 Another similarly maintains that the kind of
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extremists that might be constitutive of a Christian Right are usually no more than ‘screaming
mullahs … somebody with a laptop in a bedroom with an attitude’. While developments in
the United States are said to be ‘really influential in terms of how it informs the Evangelical
church in the UK’, the idea of importing some form of U.S-style ‘culture wars’ is regarded as
wholly inappropriate. Despite noting that ‘there are some here in the UK church who’d like to
see the same thing’, the idea of attempting to gain political advantage by fostering a split
between the values of the religious and the non-religious is one that simply ‘doesn’t work’.65
The second key theme here is a rejection of the use of identity markers such as ‘Christian
Right’ or ‘fundamentalist’ as ways of describing conservative Christian groups. The use of
such labels is not only considered to be a misrepresentation of their actual beliefs – which are
said to be straightforward, mainstream, orthodox Christianity – but is also a point of political
contestation given the negative connotations attached to such labels in the British context. As
such, their use is considered to be little more than an attempt by opponents of conservative
Christian groups to undermine their efforts without having to actually engage with the
arguments. On this point, for example, one representative claims that ‘We’re not trying to be
a religious right’, and that:
People very often want to label you a fundamentalist as if it’s something dangerous and
scary … Well if fundamentalist means whether I believe the fundamentals of the Bible,
yes I believe the fundamentals of the Bible … but believing in those fundamentals
doesn’t make me an extremist it makes me mainstream because I believe what Jesus
believed. I believe what the apostles and the disciples believed.66
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Another interviewee makes an equally robust assertion. As they put it, the language of
fundamentalism is nothing more than ‘a strategy that is being used to undermine a particular
point of view’. Thus:
It does my head in, because I think just because an individual believes in the
fundamentals of the Christian gospel doesn’t make them a fundamentalist … just
because I have sincerely held Christian views, literally believing in the resurrection, in
the atonement of sin, and just because I happen to believe that homosexuality in a sinful
practice, you know, I’m labelled as a fundamentalist.67
Making the exact same point, another respondent maintains that their organisation is ‘more
Methodist socialism than any kind of … right wingerry’, and claims that the term
‘fundamentalist’ is simply used as a term of abuse, amounting to little more than ‘a kind of
name-calling’, the throwing of ‘insults’ and ‘an ad hominem attack’. As they put it:
‘Everybody believes something fundamentally, I just happen to believe that God exists and
he became man in the Lord Jesus Christ, walked this earth, died, was buried and rose again
and is seated in heaven and will come again in glory, you know, I believe the creed … it’s
just ordinary Christianity’.68 Making the distinction equally clear, another interviewee (noting
that ‘a lot of people would probably say I’m on the lunatic fringe’) maintains that the term
‘fundamentalist’ is intensely problematic ‘because I don’t think people understand what it
means’. ‘Personally’, they add, ‘I don’t see … us as being right-wing fundamentalist in any
sense ... I’d say we’re just orthodox’.69
Basing a collective action frame on the dangers of secularisation and the marginalisation of
Christianity might serve as a useful agent of group cohesion, but a central (and to an extent,
paradoxical) feature of this narrative is its overtly secular character. While the beliefs and
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activities of conservative Christian groups are driven and motivated by theological concerns
the ‘outward-facing’ arguments that are deployed in respect of trying to shape sociocultural
attitudes and issues of public policy are overwhelmingly framed in terms of secular norms
and values. Arguments about abortion, for example, are typically based on issues such as
survival rates for premature births, medical advances involving human embryo research are
often opposed on ‘slippery slope’ grounds involving the social consequences of unregulated
scientific technology, the case against assisted dying has been similarly based around the
implications for the most vulnerable groups in society, while opposition to the legalisation of
same-sex marriage was based primarily around claims of historical tradition, the lack of an
electoral mandate, and the social problems that (it was said) would invariably result.70
Framing core arguments in this way reflects a recognition (if tacitly) of the fact that, in an
increasingly secularised society, religious groups can best hope to influence wider opinion by
avoiding narrative claims that are couched in theological terms and by framing them within a
secular language of minority rights and freedoms.71 These strategic requirements are well
recognised by representatives of conservative Christian groups themselves. Explaining the
reasoning behind the use of secular rather than religious arguments by their own organisation,
for instance, one representative notes that:
It’s not because they don’t have these convictions … it’s because we live in a post-
Christian society, so if I use Christian arguments most people are not going to be
persuaded by them … you’ve got to use the language that people connect with … if I’m
talking to a Christian audience, then I’ll couch it in different ways.72
On the same theme, another respondent states that the choice of ‘when to use explicit
religious arguments and language in public life’ is ‘a big issue’ for their organisation, and
22
maintains that while it remains impossible to ‘separate the theology out from public
discourse’, the danger of giving a green light to the use of theological arguments was that
they ‘could end up with all sorts of stuff’ that could be politically disadvantageous. Thus, as
they explain:
There’s a time and a place for it … 99% of your Christian discourse is going to be
implicit rather than explicit in that context, so you’ve got to be sensible about this, I
think, because it plays into the hands of the secularists who just want to paint us as
some sort of gung-ho.73
A related theme here is that the use of secular arguments does not contradict theologically-
based claims, but, rather, that the two are complementary forms of reasoning, with the
findings of science and social scientific research said to be supportive of the underlying
theological position. Thus, as one respondent observes, on the specific issue of same-sex
marriage: ‘It’s not that we’re dinosaurs or, you know, stick-in-the-muds … it’s everything to
do with the way the world is made … all the evidence is that children in a secure mother-
father family do best’.74 The decision to use secular, as opposed to theological arguments,
then, is:
Because what we’re trying to do, what Christians in this are trying to do, is persuade …
the majority, the people who are not swayed by religious arguments as such, that this
particular view is right … the appeal is made on arguments that are common ground
arguments, common good arguments, and they should be. If God is the creator, then
what is good for the creation will be in harmony with what God says.75
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Another interviewee sets out the same line of argument. As they put it: ‘the kind of
apologetics that I would offer around the position we take is not couched in a religious
argument … in my view there is enough in science that would support the view that we take’.
The use of an overtly secular language, then, is because ‘most religious groups realise that
they have a particular take on reality which is not shared across the board’, but also that the
findings of science and religion on issues such as the dangers of homosexuality and abortion
are such that ‘in terms of the scientific data … there’s no need to appeal to the religious
argument’.76 Another representative argues that a successful defence of heterosexual
marriage can be made on secular grounds because ‘science shows and studies show that
children do best when raised by a mother and a father’. As they put it: ‘I think a lot of secular
interfacing arguments were made because they can be made’, and that ‘I believe them from a
faith perspective, from believing in the bible, but science and sociology and life backs it up, it
always does … that’s the truth’.77
Conclusion: the limits of secular discourse
The application of Social Identity Theory to an analysis of Britain’s ‘Christian Right’ yields a
number of important points. One is that the debate about the existence of a Christian Right
comparable to that in the U.S. is, to a large, extent a definitional one. Determining the scale
and character of ‘fundamentalist’ Christianity remains an intensely problematic exercise due
to gaps in the available data as well as the pejorative context and lack of consensus that
surrounds the meaning of the term. A critical issue here, then, is the way in which collective
identity markers such as ‘Christian Right’ are enmeshed within a variety of broader political
factors relating to the dynamics of group mobilisation. These centre on the need to maintain
internal cohesion and distinctiveness, while at the same time position a group externally to
achieve wider political goals. In this respect a central challenge for conservative Christian
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groups in Britain has been the increasing secularisation of British society and culture. The
common response to this has been the deployment of a collective action frame based on the
social problems of secularisation and the threat posed to religious rights and freedoms. A key
part of this narrative also involves the rejection of negatively perceived labels, such as
‘Christian Right’ and ‘fundamentalist’, which are said to be little more than an ad hominem
attack by opponents wishing to paint conservative Christian groups as hotbeds of religious
extremism.
This approach, however, is far from problem free. Framing core arguments in secular terms
may well be necessary for appealing to a wider audience but the evidence to date suggests
that their influence has been mixed. Notwithstanding some limited measures of success, such
as helping to shape a popular news agenda around themes of religious discrimination (with
close links between certain conservative Christian groups and sections of the right-wing
media), such gains need to be weighed against other, and potentially more substantial,
reversals such as the failures on abortion, medical science and same-sex marriage as well as
the repeated loss of legal challenges brought on issues of employment discrimination.
The use of a secularised discourse for collective action framing is also something of a double-
edged sword. For one, assertions of marginalisation and claims that religious groups need to
be accorded the same formal rights and equalities as other social interests themselves go to
highlight the sectional character of religious groups, thereby undermining claims about the
need for special treatment in the form of political and legal privileges in defence of religious
freedoms. This is especially pressing when these privileges can be seen as traducing the
rights of other minorities. Another, and potentially more serious, problem, however, is that
the adoption of a secular discourse effectively reduces the amount of control that religious
groups have over the direction of their own narrative claims and structures. In contrast to the
use of theological arguments, about which religious groups can claim to have particular
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expertise, attempting to legitimise public policy arguments with recourse to secular norms
supported by scientific research can expose groups to unexpected shifts in the evidence base
that can challenge and undermine the core assertions that are being made. If same-sex
marriage does not lead to growing social problems, for instance, or if the legalisation of
assisted dying does not lead to a greater number of deaths amongst vulnerable groups in the
way that conservative Christian groups contend, then the credibility of the arguments being
used is likely to be eroded. Moreover, the internalisation of secular norms and a commitment
to evidence-based argument could compel religious organisations to move in directions they
may not wish to go (being forced to accept same-sex marriage once expected problems fail to
materialise, for instance), creating the risk of internal splits and fissures within their own
memberships.78
The central conclusion here, then, is that the identity and strategy of Britain’s ‘Christian
Right’ are inextricably linked. Collective identity labels reflect wider structures and processes
of political power, and can only be properly understood by locating them within this wider
context. Further research into this subject might seek to expand upon this point by exploring
the political activities of conservative Christian groups in other areas. Fruitful avenues here
might include studies of the tactics used by conservative Christian groups in specific
campaign issues (such as opposing same-sex marriage), analyses of groups and individuals
that could be said to be on the periphery of the ‘Christian Right’ (such as the Christian Party,
or the Jubilee Centre, for instance), or analyses of grass-roots conservative Christians that
compare and contrast the views presented by group leaders with those of the rank and file.
With ‘Christian Right’ groups set to remain a feature Britain’s religio-political landscape for
the foreseeable future, research such as this is essential if we are to expand our understanding
of their processes and dynamics.
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